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COMMENT
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION OF ABORTION AND
MINORS' RIGHTS UNDER THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION
Matthew B. Hayhurst
Montanans generally mind their own business and do not
wish to restrict other people in their freedoms unless the exercise
of those freedoms interferes with other members of society. This
is a rule that most of us learn in kindergarten and does not
need to be supported by reference to fancy law review articles,
exalted philosophers, or the hard to understand writing of some
federal or state court.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is found within
the "zones of privacy" protected by the United States Constitu-
tion.2 This protection is not absolute, however, and depends sig-
nificantly upon whether the woman seeking the abortion is an
adult. Following the lead of numerous other states,3 the 1995
Montana Legislature passed legislation requiring minor women
to notify their parents before obtaining an abortion.4 Shortly
1. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 11, Gryczan v. State, No.
BDV-93-1869 (D. Mont. filed Feb. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Gryzcan].
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see generally Natalie Wright, Note, State Abortion Law
After Casey: Finding "Adequate and Independent" Grounds for Choice in Ohio, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 891 (1993).
3. See Sandra M. Secrest, Note, Minors' Rights to Abortion-Are Parental No-
tice and Consent Laws Justified?, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 691, 691 n.3 (1989).
4. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-201 to -215 (1995). This legislation replaced
Montana's previous abortion notification law, the Abortion Control Act of 1974. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1993) (repealed 1995).
Montana's parental notification law requires "actual notice to one parent or to
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after its enactment, Montana's notification statute was chal-
lenged on federal constitutional grounds.' In Lambert v.
Wicklund, the United States Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the statute.7
Laws passed by the state legislature must satisfy the mini-
mal requirements of both federal and state constitutions.' While
the Wicklund decision addresses the validity of Montana's notifi-
cation statute under the federal constitution, the statute remains
untested at the state constitutional level. The Montana Constitu-
tion guarantees ninors all fundamental rights unless specifically
precluded by laws that are clearly shown to enhance minors'
protection.9 Included among minors' fundamental rights is an
expansive, textually-explicit guarantee of privacy.1" This Com-
ment argues that Montana's parental notification law, which
safeguards parental interests at the expense of minors' protec-
tion, unconstitutionally infringes upon the privacy rights of
pregnant minors. By failing to satisfy the minimal requirements
of the Montana Constitution, the legislation remains susceptible
to constitutional attack at the state level. Part II of this Com-
ment examines Montana's parental notification statute and the
United State Supreme Court's reasons for upholding the legis-
lation. Part III examines the historical development of minors'
rights and the protection afforded to minors under both the Unit-
ed States and Montana Constitutions. After tracing this evolu-
tion, this part focuses on the unique treatment of minors' rights
under the Montana Constitution and sets forth a framework for
the legal guardian of the pregnant minor .... . MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204
(1995). The term "minor" refers to "a female under 18 years of age who is not an
emancipated minor." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-203(6) (1995). An "emancipated mi-
nor" is a minor "who is or has been married or who has been granted an order of
limited emancipation by a court as provided in 41-3-406." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-
203(3) (1995). Various factors determine whether a minor is entitled to an order of
limited emancipation, including: (1) the minor's financial resources; (2) whether eman-
cipation would be in the minor's best interests; (3) the minor's ability to understand
the rights and responsibilities of adults; (4) the minor's dedication to continuing her
secondary education; and (5) whether emancipation would be in the minor's best
interests. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-408(2) (1995). For the sake of simplicity, I
intend the meaning of the term "parents," as used in this Comment, to include all
persons who may be notified by way of the Revised Act, whether one parent, both
parents, or a legal guardian would actually receive notification.
5. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (per curiam).
6. 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (per curiam).
7. See id. at 1172.
8. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
9. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15; discussion infra Part III.B.
10. See MONT. CONST. art I, § 10; discussion infra Part IV.A.
566 [Vol. 58
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION
analyzing laws affecting these rights. By examining the practical
and legal effects of parental notification, Part IV concludes that
parental notification unconstitutionally infringes upon the priva-
cy rights of minors.
II. LAMBERT V. WICKLUND AND MONTANA'S NOTIFICATION
STATUTE
In 1974, the Montana Legislature enacted the Abortion Con-
trol Act, its initial attempt to specifically regulate minors' access
to abortions." Under the threat of criminal penalties, this legis-
lation compelled physicians to notify the parents of unmarried,
minor women before performing an abortion. 2 The Abortion
Control Act initially formed the basis of the controversy in
Wicklund and provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
examine the constitutional parameters of parental notification
and minors' rights.
A. Factual and Procedural History
In 1993, Dr. Susan Wicklund, after being threatened with
enforcement of the Abortion Control Act, filed a civil rights ac-
tion on behalf of herself, other health care providers throughout
Montana and neighboring areas, and their patients.' 3 Dr.
Wicklund challenged the constitutionality of the Abortion Con-
trol Act under the federal constitution, alleging that the statute's
failure to provide an adequate procedure by which qualified
minors could judicially bypass the notification requirement ren-
dered it unconstitutional. 4 The state stipulated to the statute's
unconstitutionality, and the district court permanently enjoined
its enforcement.'5 This resolution, however, was short-lived.
In 1995, the Montana Legislature repealed the Abortion
Control Act and passed the Parental Notice of Abortion Act (the
11. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1993) (repealed 1995).
12. "No abortion may be performed upon any woman in the absence of written
notice to a parent, if living, or the custodian or legal guardian of such woman if she
is under 18 years of age and unmarried." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107(1Xb) (1993)
(repealed 1995). "Violation of this section is a misdemeanor." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
20-107(2) (1993) (repealed 1995).
13. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1170 (1997) (per curiam).
14. See Wicklund v. Salvagni, 93 F.3d 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1996). Wicklund's
original suit named Michael Salvagni, the Gallatin County Attorney, as defendant. At
the time of the United States Supreme Court's opinion, Martin D. Lambert was
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Revised Act)."6 Similar to its predecessor, the Revised Act pro-
hibits a health care provider from performing an abortion upon
an unmarried, minor woman unless the physician notifies her
parents. 7 In an attempt to avoid the problems faced by the
Abortion Control Act, however, the Revised Act provides for a
judicial bypass procedure by which minors may circumvent the
notification requirement." Specifically, a pregnant minor who
petitions the youth court may bypass the notification re-
quirement in two instances: first, where the minor proves to the
court that she "is sufficiently mature to decide whether to have
an abortion"; or second, where "the notification of a parent or
16. See id. at 569. The 1995 Montana Legislature passed the Revised Act "i(n
direct response" to the Federal District Court's order. Id. at 569. Now codified at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-201 to -215 (1995), the Revised Act provides, in pertinent
part: "A physician may not perform an abortion upon a minor or an incompetent
person unless the physician has given at least 48 hours' actual notice to one parent
or to the legal guardian of the pregnant minor or incompetent person of the
physician's intention to perform the abortion." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204 (1995).
In addition, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-208 (1995) states: "Notice is not required
under 50-20-204 or 50-20-205 if: (1) the attending physician certifies in the patient's
medical record that a medical emergency exists and there is insufficient time to
provide notice; (2) notice is waived, in writing, by the person entitled to notice; or (3)
notice is waived under 50-20-212." Furthermore, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-212
(1995) provides:
(2)(a) The minor or incompetent person may petition the youth court for a
waiver of the notice requirement and may participate in the proceedings on
the person's own behalf.
(3) Proceedings under this section are confidential and must ensure the
anonymity of the petitioner. All proceedings under this section must be
sealed. The petitioner may file the petition using a pseudonym or using the
petitioner's initials. All documents related to the petition are confidential
and are not available to the public. The proceedings on the petition must
be given preference over other pending matters to the extent necessary to
ensure that the court reaches a prompt decision. The court shall issue writ-
ten findings of fact and conclusions of law and rule within 48 hours of the
time that the petition is filed unless the time is extended at the request of
the petitioner. If the court fails to rule within 48 hours and the time is not
extended, the petition is granted and the notice requirement is waived.
(4) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is
sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion, the court shall
issue an order authorizing the minor to consent to the performance of in-
ducement of an abortion without the notification of a parent or guardian.
(5) The court shall issue an order authorizing the petitioner to consent to
an abortion without notification of a parent or guardian if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence, that: (b) the notification of a parent or
guardian is not in the best interests of the petitioner.
17. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204 (1995). According to the plaintiffs in
Wicklund, the Revised Act, "although couched in different language, imposes virtually
identical unconstitutional restrictions on minors seeking abortions." Pl.'s Supp. Compl.
at 2, Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (No. 93-92-BU-JFB).
18. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-204, -208, -212 (1995).
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guardian is not in the best interests of the petitioner."9
Shortly after the 1995 session, Dr. Wicklund renewed her
attack on the legislature's attempt to regulate minors' access to
abortion services. Wicklund filed a supplemental complaint,
challenging the validity of the Revised Act on various constitu-
tional grounds.2 ° Wicklund contended that the newly-drafted
judicial bypass provision did not comport with the constitutional
requirements set forth in Bellotti v. Baird,2 the United States
Supreme Court's seminal opinion regarding parental consent
statutes.2 Under Bellotti, a minor who demonstrates that the
desired abortion would be in her best interests must be given a
judicial bypass.23 Wicklund alleged that Montana's bypass pro-
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-212 (1995).
20. See Pl.'s Supp. Compl. at 2-3, 13-14, Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169
(1997) (No. 93-92-BU-JFB). The supplemental complaint challenged the Revised Act
on four grounds. See Memorandum and Order at 3, Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct.
1169 (1997) (No. 93-92-BU-JFB) [hereinafter Order]. The first cause of action alleged
that the Revised Act's judicial bypass procedure, which requires the service of a
summons on a minor's parents, breached confidentiality by providing an effective
notification of the minor's parents. See id. at 3-4. The second argument, which
proved successful in both the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, alleged that the Revised Act's bypass provision allowing for a waiver if
notification would not be in the minor's best interests, improperly narrowed the best
interests requirement set forth by the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 4; see
also infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. The third argument centered on due
process, asserting that the Revised Act's appellate procedure violated the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Order at 4. The last cause of
action alleged that the Revised Act's failure to require notice to the parent of the
unmarried father of the child violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id.
21. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). The Beliotti court ruled that while
state statutes may require parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion,
the state must provide a "judicial bypass" procedure that allows "qualified" minors to
circumvent the requirement. Id. at 640-43. Specifically, parental consent laws must
enable the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she shows either:
(1) that she is mature enough and well informed enough to make her abor-
tion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her
parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision
independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The
proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of
the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with ano-
nymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an
abortion to be obtained.
Id. at 643-44.
22. There is a distinction between parental consent and notification statutes.
Parental consent statutes, as the name suggests, require explicit parental permission
before the physician may perform the desired abortion. Parental notification statutes,
such as the Revised Act, require that parents receive "actual notice" of the desired
abortion. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204 (1995). I believe that the practical ef-
fects of the different statutes are, however, similar. See infra Part IV.B.
23. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
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vision, which allows a minor to circumvent the notice require-
ment when parental notification would not be in the minor's best
interests, abridged a minor's right to a bypass when the desired
abortion would be in her best interests. By focusing on the ef-
fects of parental notification and not the propriety of the desired
abortion, Wicklund contended that Montana's bypass provision
impermissibly narrowed the focus of the best interests inquiry.
Persuaded by Wicklund's argument, the federal district court
found that the Revised Act created an undue burden on a
minor's right to privacy." Relying primarily on the minimum
requirements for a judicial bypass set forth in Bellotti, the dis-
trict court stated:
The Montana judicial bypass statute does not conform with the
Bellotti standards, impermissibly narrows the scope of the "best
interests" inquiry, and places an undue burden upon the right
of a minor who is able to show that the abortion is in her best
interests, to obtain an abortion without parental involvement.
It is therefore unconstitutional.'
Because the Revised Act's judicial bypass placed an undue bur-
den on the minor seeking the abortion, the district court struck
down the Revised Act as unconstitutional and permanently en-
joined its enforcement. 26 The state appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's holding, noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has left open
the question of whether or not a judicial bypass to a parental
notification provision (such as the one at issue here) is constitu-
tionally required."27 To answer this question, the Ninth Circuit
found guidance in its own jurisprudence. Relying on Glick v.
McKay,28 the court scrutinized the Revised Act's judicial bypass
procedure. 29 In Glick, the Ninth Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of Nevada's parental notification statute." Like
Montana's Revised Act, Nevada's statute allowed a pregnant
minor to circumvent the notice requirement if she could show
that parental notification would not be in her best interests.3'
24. See Order, supra note 20, at 9.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 10.
27. Wicklund v. Salvagni, 93 F.3d 567, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
28. 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991).
29. See Salvagni, 93 F.3d at 571-72.
30. See Glick, 937 F.2d at 435.
31. See id. at 437. The Nevada statute allowed a minor to bypass the notifica-
tion requirement if "parental notification would be detrimental to her best interests."
570 [Vol. 58
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Focusing on the difference between Nevada's statute and the
Bellotti requirement that a minor may bypass notification if she
can show that the desired abortion would be in her best inter-
ests, the Glick court stated:
Rather than requiring the reviewing court to consider the
minor's "best interests" generally, the Nevada statute requires
the consideration of "best interests" only with respect to the
possible consequences of parental notification. The best inter-
ests of a minor female in obtaining an abortion may encompass
far more than her interests in not notifying a parent of the
abortion decision. Furthermore, in Bellotti, the court expressly
stated, "[i]f, all things considered, the court determines that an
abortion is in the minor's best interests, she is entitled to court
authorization without any parental involvement.32
Thus, the Glick court concluded that the Nevada statute was
unconstitutional because it "impermissibly constricted the mean-
ing of 'best interests'... ."' Finding Montana's bypass proce-
dure "for all practical purposes, identical to the Nevada provi-
sion," the Ninth Circuit struck down the Revised Act.'
B. The Holding
Relying on Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
(Akron II),"5 the United States Supreme Court reversed.36 In
Akron II, the Court found that Ohio's parental notification stat-
ute, which contained a judicial bypass procedure allowing a court
to waive the notification requirement if parental notification was
not in the minor's best interests, satisfied the Bellotti require-
ments and did not unconstitutionally burden a minor's right to
an abortion.37 Dismissing Wicklund's attempts to distinguish
Akron II, the Court stated:
Based entirely on Glick, the Ninth Circuit in this case affirmed
the District Court's ruling that the Montana statute is uncon-
stitutional .... [T]his decision simply cannot be squared with
our decision in Akron I. The Ohio parental notification statute
at issue there was indistinguishable in any relevant way from
Id.
32. Id. at 439 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648 (1979)).
33. Id. at 442.
34. Wicklund v. Salvagni, 93 F.3d 567, 572 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
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the Montana statute at issue here. Both allow for judicial by-
pass if the minor shows that parental notification is not in her
best interests. We asked in Akron H whether this met the
Bellotti requirement that the minor be allowed to show that
'the desired abortion would be in her best interests.' We ex-
pressly held that it did. Thus, the Montana statute meets this
requirement too. In concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit
was mistaken."
Therefore, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the
constitutionality of the Revised Act."
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF A MINOR'S RIGHT TO AN
ABORTION
When a woman becomes pregnant, she faces a myriad of
questions that directly affect her ethical, moral, political, and
philosophical beliefs.' For a pregnant minor, however, the is-
sues that accompany pregnancy are compounded. In addition to
the problems confronting adult women, pregnant minors may
face special, often age-specific problems of financial insecurity,
uncertain familial reaction, societal stigma, and immaturity.
The topic of pregnancy often leads to a discussion of a
woman's right to an abortion and the complex and conflicting
interests implicated in such a decision. While persons may dis-
agree about the propriety of abortion, an adult woman's right to
an abortion is constitutionally protected 41 and has been since
38. Id. at 1171-72 (citations omitted).
39. See id. at 1172.
40. The Supreme Court addressed these concerns in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, where it stated:
Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others:
for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the
persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family,
and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist,
procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent
human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential life that
is aborted.
505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
41. See id. at 853. Writing for the majority in the Supreme Court's most recent
discussion of the abortion issue, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter reaffirmed a
woman's right to an abortion as originally set forth in Roe v. Wade, while specifically
acknowledging the differences of opinion regarding the issue:
As with abortion, reasonable people will have differences of opinion about
these matters. One view is based on such reverence for the wonder of cre-
ation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term no
matter how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-
being. Another is that the inability to provide for the nurture and care of
572 [Vol. 58
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the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Roe v. Wade.42 While
an adult woman's right to abortion is fundamental, a more con-
troversial question is whether a minor's right to an abortion
should be accorded equal constitutional protection. Our nation's
highest court has answered in the negative, allowing states to
restrict minors' access to abortion within certain limitations: "We
have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing. " '
While the Revised Act satisfies the requirements of the Unit-
ed States Constitution, laws passed by the state legislature must
satisfy the requirements of both federal and state constitu-
tions. 4
In Montana we have repeatedly recognized that the state con-
stitution provides protection of rights separate from the pro-
tection afforded by the federal constitution. Because the federal
constitution establishes the floor and not the apex of constitu-
tional rights, state action may violate our Montana Constitu-
tion, but not violate any federal constitutional guarantee.'
Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court is "not compelled to
march lock-step with the pronouncements of the United States
Supreme Court if our own constitutional provisions call for more
individual rights protection than that guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."' By affording special protection to minors'
rights, the Montana Constitution attempts to ameliorate the
inequality between the protection of the rights of adults and
the infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent. These are
intimate views with infinite variations, and their deep, personal character
underlay our decisions in Griswold, Einstadt, and Carey. The same concerns
are present when the woman confronts the reality that, perhaps despite her
attempts to avoid it, she has become pregnant.
Id.
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); see also infra notes 139-42 and
accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Buckman v. Montana Deaconess Hosp., 224 Mont. 318, 324, 730
P.2d 380, 384 (1986); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 513-14, 719 P.2d 1248, 1254-
55 (1986); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (holding that "[t]o
be held constitutional, the instant [parental consent] statute must pass muster under
both the federal and state constitutions").
45. Buckman, 224 Mont. at 324, 730 P.2d at 384.
46. State v. Sierra, 214 Mont. 472, 476, 629 P.2d 1273, 1276 (1985).
1997] 573
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minors that exists under federal law. 7 While the Wicklund
court upheld the constitutionality of the Revised Act, the Court's
focus was limited to minors' rights under the federal constitu-
tion. 8 The Court's analysis did not address the constitutionality
of the Revised Act under the state constitution. 9 Such an inqui-
ry is necessary to determine whether the Revised Act violates
the rights guaranteed to minors under the Montana Constitu-
tion.
An historical examination of the development of minors'
rights is necessary to understand the level of protection attached
to juvenile rights as well as the extent to which minors' rights
are equated with adult rights to an abortion. As one scholar
recently noted, "One cannot adequately understand the present
or future of any controversy without knowing its history." ° The
following discussion examines the historical development of
minors' rights, the special protection afforded these rights by the
Montana Constitution, and the Montana Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of this protection. When faced with a constitutional
challenge of the Revised Act under the Montana Constitution,
the court should make a similar examination in order to accu-
rately assess the constitutionality of parental notification.
A Early Development of Minors' Rights
From the beginning of our nation's history until the 1950s,
American courts resisted acknowledgment of minors' constitu-
tional rights.5 Despite their contribution to the welfare of the
family, children were perceived as chattels in the eyes of the
legal system.52 Until the middle of the twentieth century, mi-
nors possessed no fundamental rights to free speech, due pro-
cess, or privacy.53
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1169-72 (1997).
49. As the parties in Wicklund neither briefed nor argued the constitutionality
of the Act on state grounds, the scope of the opinion is justifiably limited to the
issues addressed.
50. 1 JENNI PARRISH, ABORTION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES xi (1995).
51. See generally Secrest, supra note 3, at 692-93.
52. See Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 35-36 (1994). Fitzgerald describes the
historical relationship between father and child as a "support for services exchange,"
whereby "[c]hildren owed their fathers their labor and any income they earned in ex-
change for their father's support of them in the household .... The support for
services exchange was no contract between voluntary parties, .... but rather mani-
fested the parent's ownership of the child." Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted).
53. See Robert B. Keitee, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On
574 [Vol. 58
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION
However, like the rights of others in historically disadvan-
taged groups, the rights of minors began to swell as changes
swept the Supreme Court during the civil rights era.' In 1954,
the Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to mi-
nors in an effort to end segregation among school children.' In
1967, the Court recognized that minors were persons under the
United States Constitution." Acknowledging high school
students' First Amendment rights to wear armbands in protest
of the war effort in Vietnam, the Court in 1969 stated that
"[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons,' under
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect, just as they themselves must
respect their obligations to the State." 7
The changes continued into the next decade.58 By the early
1970s, America's youth were exercising their newly-discovered
rights with unprecedented freedom. Thus, in addition to the
sweeping cultural changes affecting minors, the delegates who
met in 1972 to draft the Montana Constitution faced a fluctuat-
ing, progressive body of jurisprudence.
B. Minors' Rights Under Montana Law
Although the Montana Constitution underwent a complete
revision in 1972, the framers were not entirely dissatisfied with
the efforts of their historical predecessors at Bannack."9 The
and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 467-68 (1982)
(citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 381 U.S. 1
(1967); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
54. See generally Secrest, supra note 3, at 692-93.
55. See Fitzgerald, supra note 52, at 22 n.55 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
56. See id. at 22 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (guaranteeing due pro-
cess guaranteed to minors in juvenile proceedings)).
57. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
58. See generally Secrest, supra note 3, at 692-93.
59. In 1864, President Lincoln signed the Organic Act, which created the Mon-
tana Territory and named Sidney Edgerton as Montana's first territorial governor.
See JAMES MCCLELLAN HAMILTON, FROM WILDERNESS TO STATEHOOD: A HISTORY OF
MONTANA 1805-1900 277-79 (1957). The city of Bannack, the territorial capitol, hosted
Montana's first territorial legislative session in December of the same year. See id. at
279-80. In addition to creating a common school system, providing for a tax struc-
ture, and allocating funds for the development of territorial transportation, the legis-
lators also set out to draft Montana's first laws:
The members of the first legislative assembly were men of ability and un-
doubted integrity. The Territory, being without laws other than the Organic
Act and the laws of Congress which were applicable, presented the twenty
1997] 575
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goal of the Bill of Rights Committee,' which penned the pro-
posed Declaration of Rights for the Montana Constitution, was to
retain traditional rights of citizens while simultaneously
"meet[ing] the changing circumstances of contemporary life."61
Accordingly, the delegation proposed constitutional protection in
certain areas in which the prior constitution remained silent:
The first of these is a relatively new area, the rights of persons
under the age of majority. There has been considerable activity
in this field, mainly concerned with the procedural rights ac-
corded young people in juvenile courts. But the increased court
and statutory activity has not changed the fact that there are
not even broad outlines of types of rights young people possess.
Young persons are not guaranteed even the procedural rights
which are deemed fundamental to a person accused of a crimi-
nal act.62
Rick Applegate, the research analyst for the Bill of Rights
Committee, reached various conclusions about the status of the
law in the area of minors' rights.' First, he discovered that the
law was not only conflicting, but also enigmatic: "[flor almost
every court decision granting a specific right to a student or a
minor, there is another decision denying him the same right."6
law-makers with a formidable task. They entered upon their labors with a
determination to give the people a set of statutes which would prove well
suited to the conditions in the communities. The volume and quantity of
the statutes enacted at this sixty-day session are proof that the efforts of
no other Montana legislature have resulted in a larger or more practicable
grist of laws.
Id. at 280-82. Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court continues to reference the
Bannack statutes as historical legal authority. See, e.g., State ex rel. Great Falls
Tribune Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 238 Mont. 310, 317, 777 P.2d 345,
349 (1989) ("Since the days of the Bannack statutes, the sittings of all courts by
statute in Montana have been required to be public."); Ronek v. Gallatin County, 227
Mont. 514, 516, 740 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1987) ("'he common law powers and duties of
the prosecutor can be traced back to the English common law and have been part of
our system of jurisprudence since the days of the Bannack statutes.").
60. The eleven members of the Bill of Rights Committee consisted of the follow-
ing persons: Wade J. Dahood (Chairman), Chet Blaylock (Vice Chairman), Bob Camp-
bell, Dorothy Eck, Donald R. Foster, R. S. "Bob" Hanson, George H. James, Rachell
K Mansfield, Lyle R. Monroe, Marshall Murray, and Veronica Sullivan. See Montana
Constitutional Convention Bill of Rights Committee Proposal (1972), reprinted in II
MONTANA CONSTrrToNAL CONVENTION 659 (1972) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION].
61. Id. at 618.
62. Rick Applegate, Montana Constitutional Convention Study No. 10, Bill of
Rights, at 12 (1972).
63. See id. at 301-05.
64. Id. at 301 (quoting JEAN STROUSE, UP AGAINST THE LAW xi (1970)).
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Second, he recognized the law's presumption of a minor's need
for "special" treatment within the context of the juvenile justice
system. 5 While the special status of minors was intended to
promote a flexible and personalized approach within the judicial
system, Applegate discovered that the true effects had been quite
different, resulting in impersonal, arbitrary, and paradoxical
treatment of minors' rights.6" Nonetheless, he noted the United
States Supreme Court's trend of moving toward more protection
of minors' rights.67 Finally, he considered the rights of parents
to guide the lives of their children, concluding that "the issue is
'how the limits of adult control may be drawn so as not to in-
fringe on the child's right to grow in freedom in accordance with
the spirit of civil liberties embodied in the Constitution.'""
Persuaded by Applegate's conclusions and unsettled by "the
fact that young people have not been held to possess basic civil
rights,"6 the Bill of Rights Committee proposed a provision in
the Declaration of Rights intended to equalize minor and adult
rights. The provision, which expressly grants minors all funda-
mental rights contained in Montana's constitution, permits the
infringement of minors' rights only "by laws designed and op-
erating to enhance the protection for such persons."7" This con-
stitutional provision, which was ratified almost verbatim by the
Constitutional Convention, reads: "The rights of persons under
18 years of age shall include, but not be limited to, all the funda-
mental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by laws
which enhance the protection of such persons."71 As stated by its
drafters, the purpose of the provision is "to recognize that per-
sons under the age of majority have the same protections from
governmental and majoritarian abuses as do adults. In such cas-
65. Id.
66. See id. at 301-03. Applegate noted:
This difficulty-that minors have fewer constitutional rights than adults-is
especially difficult to understand when it is noted that they [minors] are
liable for punishment for many more offenses than are adults: disobedience,
running away from home, staying out late, associating with persons deemed
"undesirable," being late for school, wearing their hair long or wearing
armbands, publishing opinions critical of administrators and so on.
Id. at 302 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969)).
67. See id. at 303-04.
68. Id. at 305 (quoting White House Conference on Children, Report to the
President 351 (1970)).
69. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 635.
70. Id.
71. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15 (emphasis added).
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es where the protection of the special status of minors demands
it, exceptions can be made on clear showing that such protection
is being enhanced."72
C. In re C.H.: The Meaning of Montana's Constitutional
Provision on Minors' Rights
The Montana Supreme Court has had few opportunities to
thoroughly interpret the minors' rights provision of the Montana
Constitution.73 In In re C.H. 7' however, the court underwent a
comprehensive examination of the constitutional provision and
set forth a framework for analyzing laws affecting minors'
rights.75 Specifically, when the right of a minor is contested un-
der the Montana Constitution, the court applies a four-part test:
(1) analyze the nature of the minor's right affected by the disput-
ed legislation; (2) determine whether the legislation infringes on
that right; (3) if an infringement is found, balance the right that
has been invaded against the rights of the minor that are alleg-
edly enhanced by the legislation; and finally (4) determine
whether the invasion is justified by a sufficiently compelling
state interest.76
1. The Holding of In Re C.H.
In In re C.H., the court was asked to decide whether a court-
ordered, forty-five day detention in a reform school, which was
authorized under the Montana Youth Court Act, violated the
minor's rights under the Montana Constitution.77 The court be-
72. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 636.
73. When presented with opportunities to review the minors' rights provision,
the Montana Supreme Court's review has been limited. See, e.g., In re Wood, 236
Mont. 118, 127, 768 P.2d 1370, 1376 (1989); In re Peterson, 235 Mont. 313, 320, 767
P.2d 319, 323 (1989) (Sheehy, J., dissenting); In re T.L.G., 214 Mont. 164, 168, 692
P.2d 1227, 1229 (1984); State v. Wilson, 194 Mont. 530, 534, 634 P.2d 172, 174
(1981); In re Gullette, 173 Mont. 132, 136, 566 P.2d 396, 398 (1977).
74. 210 Mont. 184, 683 P.2d 931 (1984).
75. See id. at 197-204, 683 P.2d at 938-41.
76. See id.
77. The minor alleged that the forty-five day detention violated the due process,
equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the federal and
state constitutions. See id. at 187, 683 P.2d at 933. Although federal constitutional
issues were raised, the court based its holding on state constitutional grounds, de-
claring: 'Iblecause the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of
whether a juvenile's physical liberty is a fundamental right, subject to constitutional
protection and strict scrutiny equal protection analysis, we look to the 1972 Constitu-
tion of the State of Montana." Id. at 201. 683 P.2d at 940.
578 [Vol. 58
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gan its inquiry by considering the nature and extent of the rights
affected by the forty-five day detention.78 After examining the
preamble and portions of the Declaration of Rights, the C.H.
court held that the constitutional right at issue-physical liber-
ty-was a fundamental right of the minor under the Montana
Constitution. 7' Next, the court examined whether the disputed
law infringed on the minor's right at issue.' Not surprisingly,
the C.H. court found that the forty-five day detention invaded
the minor's right to physical liberty.8' The court then focused on
the final and most important issue: "[hiaving addressed the na-
ture of the right affected and the extent to which it was affected,
our next step is to determine whether there is a compelling state
interest sufficient to warrant such an infringement." 2
In order to determine whether a state interest justified the
invasion of the minor's right, the court performed a balancing
test. Referring to the Montana Constitution's provision on
minors' rights, the court stated that "[i]n contrast to the federal
constitution, the Montana Constitution specifically compares the
rights of children with those of adults."' Acknowledging that
"the State's interest in protecting children may conflict with
their fundamental rights," the C.H. court concluded that under
the Montana Constitution the proper analysis was to balance the
minor's right at stake against the rights of the minor which are
allegedly enhanced by the disputed law." Thus, the court
weighed a minor's fundamental right to physical liberty against
"her right to be supervised, cared for and rehabilitated."' Ac-
cording to the supreme court, this analysis "is precisely what the
drafters of the 1972 Montana Constitution had in mind when
they explicitly recognized that persons under 18 years of age
would enjoy the same fundamental rights as adults, unless ex-
ceptions were made for their own protection.""
Ultimately, the court searched for and found a pair of "legiti-
78. Prior to examining the nature of the right affected, the court determined
that the minor's classification as a delinquent youth did not constitute a suspect
class for equal protection purposes. See id. at 198, 683 P.2d at 938 ("When a statute
is challenged on -equal protection grounds, the first step is to identify the classes
involved and determine whether the classes are similarly situated.").
79. See id. at 201, 683 P.2d at 940.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 201-02, 683 P.2d at 940.
83. Id. at 202, 683 P.2d at 940.
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mate, compelling state purposes" aimed at enhancing the protec-
tion of minors.87 The court specifically found that the disputed
law served "(1) to rehabilitate youthful offenders by providing for
their care, protection and wholesome mental development before
they become adult criminals, and (2) to substitute a program of
supervision, care and rehabilitation and remove the element of
retribution from a youth who has violated the law."' According-
ly, the court justified the infringement of the youth's liberty
interest and upheld the validity of the disputed legislation.89
2. The Effect of In re C.H.: Scrutiny of Laws Affecting Minors'
Rights
In addition to supplying a four-step constitutional frame-
work for analyzing minors' rights, In re C.H. sheds considerable
light on the scrutiny to which invasions of minors' fundamental
rights-including abortion-are subjected. First, under
Montana's constitution, the rights of minors are compared to
adult rights. With the specific exception that certain laws
clearly shown to enhance minors' protection may abridge minors'
rights, Montana's youth possess the same fundamental rights as
do adults.91 Second, because "the State's interest in protecting
children may conflict with their fundamental rights,"92 the Mon-
tana Constitution demands a balancing of interests when minors'
rights are at stake. The balance, however, does not occur be-
tween the minor's rights and the rights of her parent. Rather, in
the case of an abortion notification statute, the proper inquiry
focuses exclusively on the opposing interests of the minor woman
and requires a balance between the minor's fundamental right of
privacy and the "legitimate, compelling state purposes" aimed at
enhancing the protection of the minor.9" Consequently, the in-
fringement of a minor's fundamental right is subjected to strict
scrutiny, the highest level of constitutional protection,94 and to
87. Id.
88. Id. While these interests arguably enhance the protection of minors, I be-
lieve they are primarily aimed at enhancing the protection of the state's interest in
controlling delinquent minors. Indeed, the C.H. court noted that delinquent youth
typically have a "need for stronger and wiser authority than has been exercised by
the parents . . . ." Id. at 203-04, 683 P.2d at 941 (quoting In re Geary, 172 Mont.
204, 209, 562 P.2d 821, 824 (1977)).
89. See id. at 204, 683 P.2d at 941.
90. See id. at 202, 683 P.2d at 940.
91. See id. at 203, 683 P.2d at 941.
92. Id. at 202, 683 P.2d at 940.
93. Id. at 202-03, 683 P.2d at 940-41.
94. See generally, Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 302, 911 P.2d 1165,
580 [Vol. 58
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an additional requirement that the competing state interest be
clearly shown to enhance the protection of the minor.95
In In re C.H., the Montana Supreme Court recognized the
special protection granted to minors under the state constitution.
By paralleling adult and minor rights, subjecting laws affecting a
minor's fundamental rights to strict scrutiny, and balancing the
minor's autonomy with a state interest shown to enhance her
protection, the supreme court gave minors' rights the special
protection that exemplifies Montana's attempt to enhance and
safeguard the protection of its youth.
IV. MINORS' RIGHTS AND PARENTAL NOTIFICATION OF ABORTION
While the Wicklund Court found the Revised Act valid under
the federal constitution, the legislation remains untested at the
state level. To pass muster under the Montana Constitution, the
Revised Act must survive scrutiny under the four-step constitu-
tional framework articulated in In re C.H.96 Specifically, the
court will need to: (1) determine the nature of the right affected
by parental notification; (2) examine whether the Revised Act in-
fringes upon that right; (3) balance the right invaded by parental
notification against the rights of the minor that are allegedly en-
hanced by the Revised Act; and (4) determine whether a compel-
ling state interest justifies the infringement." This analysis
requires an examination of the practical and legal effects of pa-
rental notification to determine whether the Revised Act enhanc-
es the protection of the minors, or whether the intent and effect
lay elsewhere.
1173-74 (1996). The court stated:
The most stringent standard [of constitutional review], strict scrutiny, is im-
posed when the action complained of interferes with the exercise of a fun-
damental right or discriminates against a suspect class .... Strict scrutiny
of a legislative act requires the government to show a compelling state
interest for its action. When the government intrudes upon a fundamental
right, any compelling state interest for doing so must be closely tailored to
effectuate only that compelling state interest.
Id, (citations omitted). See also Gulbrandson v. Carey, 272 Mont. 494, 502-03, 901
P.2d 573, 579 (1995) (setting forth the three standards of constitutional scrutiny
utilized by the Montana Supreme Court: strict scrutiny, intermediate standard, and
rational basis).
95. See C.H., 210 Mont. at 202-03, 683 P.2d at 940.
96. See supra Part III.C.2.
97. See supra Part III.C.2.
1997] 581
17
Hayhurst: Minors' Rights under the Montana Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
A. The Nature of the Right Affected by Parental Notification
The first step of analysis requires an inquiry into the nature
of the right affected by the Revised Act. Since Roe v. Wade,98 it
has been well-accepted that interference with a woman's decision
to have an abortion evokes her right to privacy." With respect
to the interference of a minor's abortion decision caused by pa-
rental notification, it is important to specify the nature of the
minor's privacy right. At its core, parental notification requires a
woman to divulge the most personal of information to her par-
ents.
Of all the decisions a person makes about his or her body, the
most profound and intimate relate to two sets of ultimate ques-
tions: first, whether, when, and how one's body is to become the
vehicle for another human being's creation; second, when and
how-this time there is no question of "whether"--one's body is
to terminate its organic life. 1"
The question, therefore, is whether Montana protects its minors
against mandatory disclosure of profound and intimate informa-
tion. In a state where minding one's own business is a rule that
"most of us learn in kindergarten,"1 1 it may come as little sur-
prise to find that such a right not only exists, but also enjoys
specific constitutional protection that "is more substantial than
that inferred from the Federal Constitution."1°2
With few other states in its company,1 3 the Montana Con-
stitutional Convention drafted a textually-explicit privacy right
by declaring that "[tihe right of individual privacy is essential to
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992).
100. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989) (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CoNsTITuTIoNAL LAw 1337-38 (2d ed. 1988)).
101. Gryczan, supra note 1, at 11.
102. Montana Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 440, 649
P.2d 1283, 1286 (1982).
103. Ten state constitutions contain explicit privacy provisions. See Wright, supra
note 2, at 903 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARiz. CoNST. . art. II, § 8; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA CONsT. art. I, § 23; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; HAW.
CONST. art. I. § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST.
art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7). It is noteworthy, however, that only Florida
and California have interpreted their constitutions' privacy provisions to provide spe-
cifically for abortion protection. See id. (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
1989) (holding that Florida's parental consent statute unconstitutionally infringed on
a minor woman's privacy right under the state constitution); Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) (striking down a statute
withholding state medical benefits to poor women desiring an abortion as an invasion
of California's textual privacy provision).
582 [Vol. 58
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the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without
the showing of a compelling state interest."' This constitution-
al provision creates and protects an expansive privacy right that
encompasses both personal liberty"e and "the ability to control
access to information about oneself.""° Minors, who are "afford-
ed the same protection against majoritarian abuses as are
adults," °7 enjoy this broad and inalienable right of privacy un-
less specifically precluded by a law clearly shown to enhance
their protection."5 By subjecting "the most profound and inti-
mate" decision to parental scrutiny, parental notification affects
a fundamental right that courts afford "every protection avail-
able under th[e] most stringent standard of judicial review."'0 9
B. The Infringement of Parental Notification
Montana's treatment of the privacy right assists in deter-
mining whether parental notification constitutes an infringement
of a minor's privacy. The Montana Supreme Court has articulat-
ed a two-part test that must be met before constitutional privacy
protection will safeguard personal information."0 First, the
party seeking protection must subjectively expect that the infor-
mation will remain private."' Second, society must recognize
the party's expectation of privacy as reasonable." This test
will determine whether the right to privacy applies to a minor's
104. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
105. Cf Town of Ennis v. Stewart, 247 Mont. 355, 359, 807 P.2d 179, 182 (1991)
(holding that Montana's constitutional right of privacy protects a resident's "decision
to drink whatever type of potable water they choose within their home .... (But]
the right to pipe in and have available the type of water they choose . . . does not
involve the kind of individual autonomy or freedom 'from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person ..... 'necessary to invoke
constitutional protection").
106. Montana Human Rights Div., 199 Mont. at 440, 649 P.2d at 1287 (citing
State v. Hyem, 193 Mont. 51, 630 P.2d 202 (1981)); see generally, Larry M. Elison &
Deborah E. Elison, Comments on Government Censorship & Secrecy, 55 MONT. L.
REV. 175 (1994) (examining constitutional protection of privacy and the right to
know).
107. CONsTrruTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 636.
108. See supra Part III.B; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
109. David Gorman, Comment, Rights in Collision: The Individual Right of Pri-
vacy and the Public Right to Know, 39 MONT. L. REv. 249, 251 (1978).
110. See Montana Human Rights Div., 199 Mont. at 442, 549 P.2d at 1287 (cit-
ing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)); see generally, Elison, supra note
106, at 195 n. 102.
111. See Montana Human Rights Div., 199 Mont. at 442, 549 P.2d at 1287 (cit-
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decision to undergo an abortion.
The first part of the test is easily met. While subjective ex-
pectations of privacy may vary from person to person, a minor
facing parental notification has chosen not to voluntarily involve
her parents in a profoundly personal decision. The desired paren-
tal exclusion, in and of itself, demonstrates her subjective expec-
tation, or at least hope, that the desired abortion will remain
private. This hope, however unrealistic, is sufficient to satisfy
the first prong of the test.
The second part of the test requires that society be willing to
recognize the minor's expectation of privacy as reasonable."'
The Montana Supreme Court, perhaps drawing from the lessons
learned in kindergarten, has exhibited a willingness to recognize
subjective expectations of privacy as reasonable."' Generally,
whether protection attaches depends on whether the information
is "damaging" to the individual asserting the right.1 " When the
information is not "entirely free" of references to drug, alcohol,
health or family problems,' sexual activity,"' or professional
criticism,"' the court has invoked Montana's privacy protection
to prevent forced disclosure. The information disclosed through
parental notification, which exposes "the most profound and
intimate" decision a young woman makes about her body, unde-
niably contains the type of damaging information that the consti-
tution and the courts are designed to protect. Society's willing-
ness to shield personal information from forced disclosure, cou-
pled with a pregnant minor's subjective expectation of privacy,
places a minor's abortion decision within the broad purview of
Montana's constitutionally guaranteed privacy protection."9
Although the two-part test demands privacy protection for a
minor's desired abortion, an examination of the varying and
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Belth v. Bennett, 227 Mont. 341, 740 P.2d 638 (1987) (protecting
insurance company's right of privacy shielding previously-released financial state-
ments of insurance company from public access).
115. Montana Human Rights Div., 199 Mont. at 442, 649 P.2d at 1287; see gen-
erally, Elison, supra note 106, at 192-95 (examining case law interpreting the right
to know under the Montana Constitution).
116. Id.
117. See State v. Burns, 253 Mont. 37, 830 P.2d 1320 (1992).
118. See Flesh v. Board of Trustees, 241 Mont. 158, 786 P.2d 4 (1990) (protect-
ing a grievance complaint filed against school administrator from disclosure under
privacy provision). But see Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff, 238
Mont. 103, 775 P.2d 1267 (1989) (subjecting the identity of law enforcement officers
disciplined for excessive use of force to public disclosure).
119. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
584 [Vol. 58
20
Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/6
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION
practical effects of notification on the modern family reveals
further avenues of infringement. Simply put, the effects of paren-
tal notification on the personal privacy of a pregnant minor seek-
ing an abortion depend, at least in part, on the nature of her
family unit. In some circumstances, parental notification facili-
tates fruitful discourse between parent and daughter regarding a
profound and intimate personal decision with potential long-term
effects. This is not to say, however, that a minor who receives
valuable parental guidance as a result of notification has suf-
fered no invasion of her privacy rights. Indeed, "[privacy has
been defined as the ability to control access to information about
oneself."' 2 Regardless of her parents' ultimate reaction to the
information, the right of privacy belongs to the minor and forced
disclosure of an otherwise private medical procedure invades this
right.
When parental notification has its desired effects, 1 the
temptation exists to justify the means with the end. However, to
assume that all parents will react reasonably (or even civilly)
when confronted with the knowledge that their daughter is sexu-
ally active, pregnant, and seeking an abortion ignores the reali-
ties of the modern family.
Not every pregnant adolescent has parents out of the comfort-
ing and idyllic world of a Norman Rockwell painting. Indeed,
anyone familiar with the dependency cases heard in this state's
juvenile courts understands that many pregnant adolescents
have no competent and caring parent to consult, and that for
them parental consultation is not an option.'
Based on her parent's religious, moral, and political beliefs, a
minor may feel that notifying her parents will lead to irreparable
family harm, ostracism, or abuse. This fear may prevent a minor
from exercising her right to a clinical abortion, or worse, may
lead to self-induced abortion.'
120. State v. Hyem, 193 Mont. 51, 62, 630 P.2d 202, 209 (1981).
121. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
122. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lundgren, 912 P.2d 1148, 1171 (Cal.
1996) (Kennard, J., dissenting); see Wicklund v. Salvagni, 93 F.3d 567, 570 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1996).
123. In an article entitled "Abortion Would Have Hurt Mom and Dad," Mark
Patinkin of the PROVINCE JOURNAL relays the story of 17-year-old Becky Bell who
died as a result of an infection caused by a "botched abortion" using "a coat hanger
or a knitting needle." Hearing on House Bill 482, House Judiciary Committee, ex. 21
(Feb. 14, 1995) [hereinafter House Hearing]. Patinkin writes:
Becky Bell died from a botched abortion as a direct result of Indiana's so-
called "parental consent" law. Not wanting to "disappoint" her parents by
1997] 585
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While the Revised Act contemplates notification and not
consent, it fails to consider the power imbalance inherent in
parent-child relationships. A minor's limited resources, whether
financial or otherwise, limit her autonomy while increasing pa-
rental influence and control over decision-making. The state ex-
plicitly recognizes this power imbalance and the potential for
parents to restrain or dominate their daughter's reproductive
decision through financial deprivation or "by force, threat of
force, or deprivation of food and shelter."' 4 However, minors'
protection against parental coercion is limited. The Revised Act
only prevents parents from coercing a minor to undergo an abor-
tion, and no analogous protection is given to a minor's decision
not to carry a child to term.' Although the legislature has
chosen to selectively protect a minor's reproductive choice, a
parent's ability to coerce a minor into unprepared or unwilling
motherhood should not be ignored. In such a situation, when
parental notification subjects a minor's abortion decision to fi-
nancial or physical influence, the resulting infringement of the
minor's right of privacy is clear.
While these circumstances may not accurately represent the
typical reaction of Montana's parents to news of their daughter's
desired abortion, the true effects of legally mandated parental
notification and the realities of contemporary Montana family
life cannot be ignored. Evidence suggests, for example, that most
Montana minors voluntarily seek parental involvement when
seeking an abortion, and only fail to do so when family instabili-
ty, parental illness, or potential abuse are at issue.'?6
telling them of her dilemma, Becky's only legal choices were to sneak across
the state line to Kentucky for a safe, legal abortion or to beg an anti-choice
judge to grant her a waiver. She never made it to Kentucky, dying of a
massive septic infection from the botched abortion.
Id.
124. "Coercion' means restraining or dominating the choice of a minor female by
force, threat of force, or deprivation of food and shelter." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-
203(2) (1995).
125. The Revised Act provides:
A parent, a guardian, or any other person may not coerce a minor to have
an abortion. If a minor is denied financial support by the minor's parents,
guardian, or custodian because of the minor's refusal to have an abortion,
the minor must be considered an emancipated minor for the purposes of
eligibility for public assistance benefits. The public assistance benefits may
not be used to obtain an abortion.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-209 (1995).
126. See House Hearing, supra note 123, ex. 15 (written testimony of Devon
Hartman, RNCNP, on behalf of Intermountain Planned Parenthood, stating that "[o]f
the 144 women age 17 and younger that we saw for abortions in 1994, 136 had
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While the purpose of a carefully drafted bypass provision is
to deal with just such circumstances, Montana's demographics
present potential problems for expedient judicial bypass. Like
many states, the Montana court system faces overcrowded dock-
ets, limited judicial resources, and pressure to streamline clogged
judicial arteries. 7 These problems may be compounded in ru-
ral regions of the state, where part-time judicial personnel and
the lack of geographic proximity impede access to the courts.
Just as courts should not overlook the diverse philosophical,
political, and religious backgrounds of Montana's citizens, they
should not ignore the realities and limitations of the state's judi-
cial system.
Parental notification, whether viewed idealistically or with
open eyes and an understanding of present day family realities,
infringes on a minor's right to privacy. This conclusion holds
firm regardless of the ultimate parental reaction to notification.
Accordingly, to defend the Revised Act, the state must be pre-
pared to make the difficult demonstration that parental notifica-
tion, while infringing minors' privacy rights, is justified because
of its enhancing effects on the protection of minors.
C. Enhancing the Protection of Minors v. Protecting Parental
Rights
The Montana Constitution requires that laws affecting
minors' fundamental rights "enhance the protection of such per-
sons."' The third stage of inquiry, therefore, is whether paren-
involved at least one parent. Of the 8 women who did not tell their parents, 4 had
involved another adult, such as a school counselor. The reasons why the 8 did not
choose to tell their parents [included] ... parental alcohol problems, parents[] di-
vorce, parents['] emotional instability from depression, [and] parents['] physical
health").
127. Montana Bar Association President Don Maclntyre recently addressed the
growing delays of litigation, stating:
Two comprehensive ABA studies document a lack of resources causing a
drastic limitation on the cases courts are able to process in many jurisdic-
tions. The public needs to be educated about the need for more resources
for the courts. Total spending for judicial and legal services (i.e., judges,
courthouses, prosecutors and public defenders) by federal, state and local
governments is only 0.7 percent of total government spending. Total
spending for all aspects of the justice system, including police, corrections,
and judicial and legal services, is less than 4 percent of total government
spending.
Don MacIntyre, More Myths that Promote Misunderstanding of our Profession, MONT.
LAW., Mar. 1997, at 4.
128. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
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tal notification enhances minors' protection. Pursuant to In re
C.H.,'" the court must balance the minor's fundamental priva-
cy right against the rights of the minor that are allegedly en-
hanced by the Revised Act.130
On its face, the Revised Act balances competing interests.
The drafters' addition of a "very broad" judicial bypass provi-
sion 3' indicates an attempt, although not specifically articulat-
ed, to balance a pregnant minor's right to privacy against her
parent's right to know. In effect, the legislature seems to have
sought to protect the parent's right to be informed of the
daughter's intended abortion at the expense of the daughter's
interest in keeping such a procedure private. However, under the
Montana Constitution, the proper inquiry is to balance the preg-
nant minor's rights at stake against her rights which are alleg-
edly enhanced by the law.'32 This inadvertent balancing act ig-
nores the constitutional requirement that parental notification
must clearly be shown to enhance the protection of minors, not
adults."'
Fortunately, a court confronting this balancing test need not
speculate about the intended effects of parental notification. Rep-
resentative Duane Grimes, the primary sponsor of the Revised
Act, spoke in terms of a multi-purpose legislation aimed at pro-
tecting the sanctity of the traditional family structure.3
Grimes stated further that a parent's ultimate financial responsi-
bility for the actions of his or her daughter entitles the parent to
129. 210 Mont. 184, 683 P.2d 931 (1984).
130. See id. at 203, 683 P.2d at 941; supra note 93 and accompanying text.
131. Hearing on House Bill 482, Senate Judiciary Committee, at 18 (Mar. 16,
1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
132. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
133. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 636 ("[Plersons under
the age of majority have the same protections from governmental and majoritarian
abuses as do adults. In such cases where the protection of the special status of mi-
nors demands it, exceptions can be made on clear showing that such protection is
being enhanced.").
134. Representative Grimes articulated the purpose of the Revised Act as four-
fold: (1) to acknowledge the traditional rights of parents to guide the lives of their
children; (2) to ensure that parents have knowledge of an upcoming surgical proce-
dure and to provide parents with the opportunity to provide important medical infor-
mation to their children's physicians; (3) to encourage pregnant minors to discuss
important decisions, such as the choice to abort, with their parents; and (4) to reduce
teenage pregnancy and abortion rates by increasing minors' responsibility. See House
Hearing, supra note 123, at 5-11; Senate Hearing, supra note 131, at 9-10, 18. In
support of the legislation, Representative Grimes also mentioned the bill's utility
regarding the acquisition of statistical data concerning abortions. See House Hearing,
supra note 123, at 8.
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notification of an intention to undergo an abortion.1" Although
numerous individuals and institutions voiced their opinions re-
garding the propriety of parental notification and its potential
effects on the rights of pregnant minors,138 the legislature
adopted Representative Grimes' rationale and enumerated six
"findings" that justify parental notification:
(a) immature minors often lack the ability to make fully in-
formed choices that take into account both immediate and long-
range consequences; (b) the medical, emotional, and psychologi-
cal consequences of abortion are sometimes serious and can be
lasting, particularly when the patient is immature; (c) the ca-
pacity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature
judgment concerning the wisdom of an abortion are not neces-
sarily related; (d) parents ordinarily possess information essen-
tial to a physician in the exercise of the physician's best medi-
cal judgment concerning the minor; (e) parents who are aware
that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better
ensure that the daughter receives adequate medical care after
the abortion; and (f) parental consultation is usually desirable
and in the best interests of the minor. 7
Perhaps foreseeing a constitutional attack, the legislature pre-
cisely articulated the purpose of the Revised Act:
[T]o further the important and compelling state interests of: (a)
protecting minors against their own immaturity; (b) fostering
family unity and preserving the family as a viable social unit;
(c) protecting the constitutional rights of parents to rear chil-
dren who are members of their household; and (d) reducing
135. See House Hearing, supra note 123, at 28.
136. See id. at 7. The following persons testified in support of House Bill 482:
Sharon Hoff, Montana Catholic Conference; Georgia Branscome; Charles Lorentzen;
Linda Lindsay; Arlette Randash, Eagle Forum; Richard Tappe, Montana Right to
Life; Tammy Peterson; and, Laurie Koutnik, Montana Christian Coalition. See id. at
5-6.
The following persons testified against the adoption of House Bill 482: Kate
Cholewa, Montana Women's Lobby; Devon Hartman, OB-GYN Nurse Practitioner,
Intermountain Planned Parenthood; Beth Sherman; Elisa Fraser, Montana Affiliate of
National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action Group (NARAL); Brenna Dorrance;
Mary Skjelset; Chris Schweitzer; Scott Crichton, American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU); National Women's Law Center; Geoffrey Birnbaum, Missoula Youth Homes;
and, Deborah Frandsen, Planned Parenthood of Missoula. See id. at 6-8.
It is noteworthy that the only minors to publicly state their views-Brenna
Dorrance, Beth Sherman, Chris Schweitzer, and Mary Skjelset-voiced their opposi-
tion to the bill. These women argued that the proposal was idealistic, posed health
hazards for minors and their children, violated their privacy rights, and ignored the
realities of the abusive household. See id. at 7.
137. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-202(1) (1995).
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teenage pregnancy and unnecessary abortion. 138
Under In re C.H., laws that protect a minor's right to "be
supervised, cared for and rehabilitated" enhance the minor's
protection and justify infringement of his or her fundamental
rights.39 Similarly, the Revised Act's legislatively dictated in-
terests appear to further the welfare of Montana's youth. The
question is whether parental notification actually enhances a
pregnant minor's protection by safeguarding her "right" to be
protected against a potentially dangerous and emotional medical
procedure, her "right" to have her parents provide medical infor-
mation to her physician, and her "right" to be guarded against
her own immaturity.
Unquestionably, parents play an integral part in the well-
being of a child and the right of parents to guide their children's
lives must be considered."4 In Bellotti v. Baird,' the United
States Supreme Court's landmark parental consent decision,
these parental interests carried considerable weight:
[Dleeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the
belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of
authority over one's children .... Properly understood, then,
the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the
basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be impor-
tant to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.'4
Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court has acknowledged the
"particular vulnerability" of children and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing." Thus, while parental notifica-
tion invades a minor's right to privacy, the infringement argu-
ably is justified by the enhanced protection stemming from pa-
138. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-202 (2) (1995).
139. See In re C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 203, 683 P.2d 931, 941 (1984).
140. While not binding on an inquiry under the Montana Constitution, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court stated that "the importance of the parental role in child
rearing" is one of three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated to those of adults." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 634 (1979). The other reasons include the "peculiar vulnerability of children
[and] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner." Id.
141. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
142. Id. at 637-39.
143. C.H., 210 Mont. at 203, 683 P.2d at 941.
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rental involvement in the abortion decision.
However, examining substance over form leads to an alter-
native conclusion: the rights that are allegedly enhanced by
parental notification dt not belong entirely to the minor. More
accurately, these so-called rights are primarily parental interests
couched in terms of minors' rights. Just as a minor's "right" to be
rehabilitated, cared for, and supervised, as articulated in In re
C.H., primarily enhances the protection of the state's interest in
controlling delinquent youths,' 44 parental notification primarily
enhances parental rights to control the lives of their daugh-
ters.'" For example, a minor's "right" to have her parents pro-
vide medical information to the attending physician equally
protects the parents' right to communicate with their daughter's
physician and learn about her current physical condition. Like-
wise, a minor's "right" to be protected against a potentially dan-
gerous and emotional medical procedure and the legislatively-
declared "right" to be protected against her own immaturity do
not provide clear protection of a minor's interests; rather these
"rights" safeguard parental interests in guiding their daughter's
lives. The Montana Constitution requires the court to balance
the minor's fundamental privacy right against the rights of the
minor that are allegedly enhanced by the Revised Act.'" Thus,
irrespective of the importance of these parental interests, paren-
tal guidance should not be protected at the expense of minors'
autonomy.
In addition to enhancing parental interests rather than
minors' rights, the time delay caused by parental notification has
potentially disastrous effects on a minor's ultimate right to an
abortion. Even the most expedient bypass 47 or the most fruit-
ful parent-daughter discourse comes at the expense of time,
which has always been a decisive factor in the abortion dilemma.
In Roe v. Wade,'" the United States Supreme Court articulated
144. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
145. In his closing remarks before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Represen-
tative Grimes emphasized the purpose of House Bill 482: "this bill is for the parents.
It will recognize the traditional rights of parents to direct the rearing of their minor
children." Senate Hearing, supra note 131, at 18.
146. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
147. If a minor petitions for a waiver of notification, the youth court must issue
a ruling within forty-eight hours or the notice requirement is waived. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-212(3) (1995). Additionally, "[tihe supreme court may adopt rules
providing an expedited confidential appeal by a petitioner if the youth court denies a
petition. An order authorizing an abortion without notice is not subject to appeal.'
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-212(8) (1995).
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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a trimester system of analysis, whereby a woman's freedom to
terminate her pregnancy depended on fetal development.149
Specifically, the Court held that a woman's abortion right was
most compelling in the first trimester, v~as diminished during
the second, and was subject to proscription in the third."5
While the Supreme Court recently modified this framework in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' fetal viability continues to de-
termine the level of permitted state interference with a woman's
abortion right.'52
Similar to Roe, Casey recognizes that the state's power to
regulate abortion increases with the development of the fetus. As
the fetus approaches viability, the state may bar abortion alto-
gether except when continued pregnancy will expose the woman
to serious health risks.'53 Indeed, "[an abortion may not be
performed within the state of Montana after viability of the
fetus, unless in appropriate medical judgment, the abortion is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Thus,
the inevitable time delay created through the notification process
and parent-daughter discourse may ultimately result in the state
having an almost absolute veto of the desired abortion. This
veto-causing effect, coupled with the medical dangers associated
with delays in the abortion process," does little to enhance the
149. See id. at 162-64.
150. See id.
151. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
152. See id. at 870 (stating that "the line should be drawn at viability, so that
before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy"). In
spite of the advances of medical technology that determine the point of fetal viabili-
ty, the Court reaffirmed the "central holding" of Roe:
[Viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life
is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
abortions. The soundness or unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in
no sense turns on whether viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as
was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does
today, or at some moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if
fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future. Whenever
it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the crit-
ical fact, just as it has done since Roe was decided....
Id. at 860. In Montana, "[v]iability' means the ability of a fetus to live outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(6) (1995).
153. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (confirming "the State's power to restrict abor-
tions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endan-
ger the woman's life or health").
154. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(1Xc) (1995).
155. In a 1988 joint policy statement, the American Academy of Family Physi-
cians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, the Organization for Obstetric, Gynecological and Neonatal Nurses,
and the National Medical Association urged that:
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protection of pregnant minors and their fundamental rights.
The negative aspects of parental notification impede the
effectuation of the state's true purpose. The focus on parental
interests and the detrimental impact of time delay during the
notification process shift the focus away from creating a proper
balance between minors' privacy interests and laws enhancing
minors' rights. This balancing requirement "is precisely what the
drafters of the 1972 Montana Constitution had in mind when
they explicitly recognized that persons under 18 years of age
would enjoy the same fundamental rights as adults, unless ex-
ceptions were made for their own protection."'56 In the final
analysis, parental interests disguised as minors' rights fail to
provide a "clear showing that... [the minor's] protection is be-
ing enhanced."'57
D. The Search for a Compelling State Interest
The last step of analysis is to determine whether a compel-
ling state interest justifies infringement of a pregnant minor's
privacy right. The Revised Act specifically states that the pur-
pose of parental notification is "to further the important and
compelling state interests of: (a) protecting minors against their
own immaturity; (b) fostering family unity and preserving the
family as a viable social unit; (c) protecting the constitutional
rights of parents to rear children who are members of their
household; and (d) reducing teenage pregnancy and unnecessary
abortion."" Irrespective of the legislature's classification of
these interests as "important and compelling," these interests
are insufficient to counterbalance the infringement of a pregnant
minor's fundamental, textually explicit privacy right.
While the four state interests enumerated in the Revised Act
appear to encompass diverse societal goals, the first three share
a common denominator: the displacement of minors' autonomy in
favor of parental control. The existence of this common element
[T]he adolescent have an opportunity for examination and counseling apart
from parents, and the same confidentiality be preserved between the adoles-
cent patient and the provider as between the parent/adult and the provid-
er.... Ultimately, the health risks to the adolescents are so impelling that
legal barriers and deference to parental involvement should not stand in
the way of needed health care.
House Hearing, supra note 123, ex. 16.
156. In re C.H., 210 Mont. at 203, 683 P.2d at 941.
157. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 60, at 636.
158. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-202(2) (1995).
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becomes clear by examining the method by which the Revised
Act implements each state interest. First, the Revised Act pro-
tects minors against their own immaturity by placing the abor-
tion decision in the hands of the parent. This shifting of power
protects parental authority at the expense of minors' freedom to
make an independent decision. Second, the Revised Act fosters
family unity and preserves the family as a viable social unit by
exposing the abortion decision to family debate. By subjecting an
otherwise private decision to parental scrutiny, forced disclosure
increases parental control and compromises minors' autonomy.
Third, the state's interest in safeguarding the constitutional
rights of parents to rear children necessarily involves the protec-
tion of parental control. Indeed, the notion of "rearing" is based
upon foundations of parental know-how, guidance, and authori-
ty.'59 The question, therefore, is whether the state has a com-
pelling interest in protecting parental authority.
The importance of parental guidance has been recognized in
Montana. In at least one context, "[t]he right of the natural par-
ents to care and custody of their children.., is a fundamental
liberty interest.""6 However, unlike Montana's privacy provi-
sion, such interests do not enjoy explicit protection in the consti-
tution. Moreover, parental guidance is selectively applied by the
legislature. With the exception of abortion, Montana permits a
pregnant minor to consent to various medical procedures involv-
ing her pregnancy and reproductive health without parental
approval.' Thus, a pregnant minor may self-consent to the de-
livery of her child and may make all health care decisions affect-
ing her child after birth,6 2 including adoption,'63 without pa-
159. The term "rear" means "to bring up (a person) by fostering, nourishing, and
instructing ... ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1891 (1976).
160. In re J.L.S., 234 Mont. 201, 205, 761 P.2d 838, 840 (1988) (holding that
termination of custody and parental rights held are in best interests of child) (citing
In re R.B., Jr., 217 Mont. 99, 703 P.2d 846, 848 (1985); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982)).
161. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(lXc) (1995) provides:
The consent to the provision of medical or surgical care or services by a
hospital, public clinic or to the performance of medical or surgical care or
services by a physician licensed to practice medicine in this state may be
given by a minor who professes or is found . . . to be pregnant .... This
self-consent only applies to the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of those
conditions specified in this subsection. The self-consent in the case of preg-
nancy ... also obliges the health professional, if he accepts the responsibil-
ity for treatment, to counsel the minor by himself or by referral to another
health care professional for counseling.
162. "A minor who has had a child may give effective consent to health service
for his child." MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(2) (1995).
163. "A parent who is a minor shall have the right to relinquish his or her child
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rental notification or approval. By excepting these procedures
from parental involvement, the state selectively applies its inter-
est in allowing parents to guide their children to the context of
abortion. The Montana Constitution specifically grants minors
"the same protections from governmental and majoritarian abus-
es" enjoyed by adults." ' The Florida Supreme Court, working
without the aid of an explicit minors' rights provision, found
such inconsistent protection of minors insufficiently compelling
to justify infringement of minors' privacy interests."6 To allow
a selectively applied state interest to justify invasion of a minor's
fundamental privacy right is to ignore the intended effect of
Montana's minors' rights provision.
The final state interest, reducing teenage pregnancy and
unnecessary abortion, is not clearly compelling. In light of "the
tradition of the state of Montana to protect every human life,
whether unborn or aged,"" this interest presumably is aimed
in large part at protecting both the health of the mother and the
life of the fetus.'67 As noted in Roe v. Wade,' the interest in
protecting the welfare of the mother does not become compelling
until the risks associated with abortion outweigh the risks of
for adoption, and such relinquishment shall not be subject to revocation by reason of
such minority." MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-105 (1995).
164. In re C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 202, 683 P.2d 931, 940 (1984).
165. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194-95 (Fla. 1989). Like Montana, Florida
law allowed minors to self consent to "any medical procedure involving her pregnancy
or her existing child-no matter how dire the possible circumstances---except abor-
tion." Id. at 1195. The Florida Supreme Court conceded that the state's interests in
protecting minors and preserving the unity of the family were "worthy objectives." Id.
However, the court concluded that
Florida does not recognize these two interests as being sufficiently compel-
ling to justify a parental consent requirement where procedures other than
abortion are concerned. ... [We are unable to discern a special compelling
interest on the part of the state under Florida law in protecting the minor
only where abortion is concerned.
Id. Thus, the court refused to justify the infringement of the minor's privacy on the
ground of a selectively applied state interest. See id. at 1195-96.
166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102 (1995); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-103
(1995) ("[a] child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person, so
far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth");
Strzelczyc v. Jett, 264 Mont. 153, 870 P.2d 730 (1994) (certifying that Montana's
wrongful death statute allows for a cause of action on behalf of a stillborn fetus).
167. The balance between fetal life and the health of the mother is evident from
the exceptions to Montana's abortion laws. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-
109(1)(c) (1995) (permitting post-viability abortion if "the abortion is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-209(1) (1995)
(waiving parental notification if "a medical emergency exists and there is insufficient
time to provide notice").
168. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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childbirth.'69 This point in time changes as medical advances
continue to reduce the risks associated with abortion.70 Thus,
if the state's interest in reducing abortion hinges upon protecting
the health of the pregnant minor, requiring parental notification
at all stages of pregnancy fails to effectively further this interest
and casts doubt on whether parental notification is narrowly
tailored to meet the state's objective.
The protection of the fetus raises somewhat different con-
cerns. Here, the court must weigh the mother's rights against
the rights of the developing fetus. Relying on Roe, the Florida
Supreme Court in In re T.W. found that the state's interest in
protecting fetal life depended on viability. 7' Upon viability, "so-
ciety becomes capable of sustaining the fetus, and its interest in
preserving its potential for life thus becomes compelling."'72
Prior to that point, however, the state's interest in protecting the
fetus is less than compelling because the mother and the fetus
are "so inextricably intertwined that their interests can be said
to coincide."'73 Thus, the T.W. court found the invasion of pri-
vacy unnecessary for the preservation of the fetus. 74
The Florida court's decision was based on Roe's trimester
system, a framework modified by the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.'75 Under Roe's "elaborate but rigid con-
struct, almost no regulation at all is permitted during the first
trimester of pregnancy."76 The Casey Court both reaffirmed
Roe's essential holding and constructed an analytical framework
169. See id. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate inter-
est in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point . . . is at approximately the
end of the first trimester. This is so because . . . until the end of the first trimester
mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.").
170. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) ("Due to technological
developments in second-trimester abortion procedures, the point at which abortions
are safer than childbirth may have been extended into the second trimester.") (citing
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 429 n.11
(1983))
171. See id. at 1193-94.
172. Id. The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
[Tihe concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is
a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb,
so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all
fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of
the woman.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973)).
173. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193.
174. See id.
175. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
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allowing for more state intervention in the abortion decision. 177
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor,
may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's
exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her
right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to
choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably
related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the health of
a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute
an undue burden.178
Thus, under current federal law, the ultimate question is wheth-
er the Revised Act imposes an undue burden on the exercise of
minors' abortion rights.
While the legislature has voiced its intent "to restrict abor-
tion to the extent permissible under decisions of appropriate
courts or paramount legislation,"179 courts should review this
question with care. Montana courts, which are free to diverge
from federal precedent,180 should examine this question from a
practical perspective, taking into account Montana's unique fa-
milial, societal, and geographic conditions. 8' In a state where
privacy is especially coveted and minors' rights enjoy special
protection, courts should carefully scrutinize any state interest
allegedly justifying the invasion of fundamental rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart,
guarantees minors all fundamental rights unless precluded by
laws that clearly enhance their protection. This special constitu-
tional provision affords minors special, not limited, protection of
their rights. Parental notification, irrespective of its constitution-
ality under the federal constitution, impermissibly abridges a
pregnant minor's inalienable right to privacy under the Montana
Constitution. Montana's parental notification law fortifies paren-
tal control at the expense of minors' rights and fails to ade-
177. See id. at 845-46.
178. Id. at 877-78 (citation omitted).
179. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-103 (1995).
180. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part IV.B.
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quately enhance the protection of pregnant minors. Moreover, it
does not further a compelling state interest capable of withstand-
ing strict scrutiny analysis.
When facing a constitutional challenge under the Montana
Constitution, the court should acknowledge practical and legal
effects of parental notification and strike down the legislation.
This result would effectuate the intent of the constitutional
drafters and place the abortion decision where it belongs: in the
hands of the young woman and her physician.
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